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Legal Issues Affecting Blue Carbon Projects on Publicly-Owned Coastal Wetlands: Executive 
Summary 
Coastal wetlands play an important role in sequestering atmospheric carbon, but these ecosystems are under 
threat from sea level rise, land use conversion, and other causes. Restoration projects in coastal wetlands can 
provide a range of benefits for habitat and ecosystems, including by increasing sequestration of “blue carbon.” 
Coastal wetland restoration projects that effectively sequester carbon and meet the requirements of the 
voluntary carbon market can generate tradeable carbon offsets, which have a monetary value and can be used 
to finance all or part of the restoration needed to generate them. Blue carbon offsets thus represent a promising 
tool to promote effective restoration and maintenance projects on threatened and degraded coastal wetlands. 
Agencies must be confident that they will not violate the law before they commit to deployment of blue carbon 
offset projects on public coastal wetlands. Federal, state, and tribal agencies are critical partners in wetlands 
restoration projects because they control a substantial portion of the nation’s coastal wetlands. However, land 
management agencies may justifiably worry about violating their legal mandates if they participate in wetland 
restoration projects funded through blue carbon offsets. In the absence of past models of successful blue carbon 
offset projects on public lands, and without explicit authorization for this activity, agency staff can benefit from 
an analytical framework to understand what legal issues may occur in a blue carbon offset project and how to 
design projects to avoid legal problems to the extent possible. This study begins to provide that framework by 
identifying legal considerations for blue carbon offset projects on public coastal wetlands.  
Agencies are faced with the difficult challenge of both complying with all relevant laws and satisfying the 
conditions necessary to qualify projects for offsets under voluntary standards. Key conditions for offset markets 
with legal implications include: (i) additionality – the project must actually sequester carbon; (ii) permanence – 
the project must provide the promised sequestration benefit over a long time period; and (iii) unambiguous 
ownership – the entity registering the carbon offset must be the only one able to reasonably claim it. Each of 
these three core conditions may result in potential legal issues when applied to blue carbon-financed restoration 
projects on public coastal wetlands. Based on an evaluation of representative federal, state, and tribal law, this 
study divides these legal issues into two broad categories: (i) title and property rights; and (ii) legal authority.  
Title and Property Rights 
Agencies can directly control activities only on lands that they own in full. Coastal wetlands raise complex 
ownership and jurisdiction issues that may undermine agency authority in several ways.  
• Property boundaries at the coast are complex. The owner of upland areas often does not own 
submerged lands, and the precise boundary between these two properties differs from state to state. 
This is a particular challenge for coastal wetlands, which often include intertidal areas that may be 
owned by multiple entities. In such cases, careful work is needed to ensure that the offset is 
unambiguously owned by the entity claiming it.  
• Coastal property boundaries are ambulatory. In other words, boundaries move over time with changes 
in sea level and coastal features. In a time of rising sea levels, a location that is upland today may be 
submerged in the future, which could result in a loss or change of sequestration benefits and change the 
ownership of the defined project area. Similarly, coastal wetlands may shift inland in response to 
changing conditions, which could implicate additional property owners. These ambulatory boundaries 
thus could raise issues related to both permanence and unambiguous ownership.  
• Public lands may be subject to private property rights or control even if owned by the government. These 
conflicting property rights claims may be a result of, for example, past sale of mineral estates or 
government acquisition of easements rather than fee simple ownership. Where a public landowner is 
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not the sole owner of rights to a property, it may not be legally authorized to exclude activities by the 
other owner that could be inconsistent with carbon sequestration, thus posing a risk to permanence of a 
blue carbon project. 
Legal Authority 
Agencies must have statutory authority in order to participate in blue carbon projects that meet the needs of 
multiple project partners, including restoration funders, service providers, and other government and private 
landowners. Fundamental questions of whether agencies are appropriately authorized to engage in offset 
project activities may pose substantial challenges to the feasibility of blue carbon offset projects that may 
require creativity to resolve. 
• Public land management agencies are not explicitly authorized to participate in blue carbon offset 
projects, but offset project activities are consistent with existing agency mandates. In the absence of 
explicit authorization, agencies must determine whether their general land management authority is 
broad enough to cover participation in coastal wetland restoration projects. This study reviewed agency 
authority and found that existing authority appears sufficiently broad to conduct a wide range of 
restoration activities consistent with blue carbon offset projects.  
 
• Blue carbon projects often require that agencies be able to accept donations, for which statutory 
authority is required and usually present. Blue carbon offset projects require land managers to partner 
with non-governmental entities, often in complex transactional relationships involving donations by 
non-governmental entities and various forms of contractual transactions among private and 
governmental project partners. Most land management agencies have relevant authority allowing them 
to acquire lands and accept donations. However, the extent and conditions on acquisitions and gifts may 
differ by agency. Key differences across agencies with respect to authority to accept donations include: 
(i) whether an agency can accept donated money and land; (ii) whether donations can be dedicated to 
particular agency activities or sites; and (iii) whether a quasi-governmental foundation is available to 
accept donations.  
 
• Carbon rights are an interest in property with monetary value, which many agencies are not authorized 
to transfer away from public ownership. Agencies have limited authority to transfer public property 
rights from public lands because such transfers may threaten the purposes for which these lands were 
set aside. While examples of authorized transactions involving interests in land abound, these 
transactions require that land management agencies have statutory authorization. While “multiple use” 
agencies charged with seeking economic returns from public land may have the requisite authority, 
many land management agencies lack appropriate authority, precluding transfers of carbon rights. 
Without a transfer of carbon rights, carbon markets may not accept that non-government project 
funders have unambiguous ownership of the carbon rights. As a result, transfer of carbon rights may 
pose the greatest challenge to successful use of carbon offsets in the coastal wetland restoration 
context. Additional research is needed to clearly delineate the extent of legal certainty required for 
unambiguous ownership of offsets and whether and how relevant agencies may be able to structure 
project memoranda of agreement that satisfy carbon market needs. 
Guidance for Land Managers 
After identifying potential legal hurdles to successful implementation of blue carbon projects on publicly-owned 
coastal wetlands, this study identifies four areas of guidance to assist project managers in identifying and 
avoiding or overcoming these hurdles. Development of blue carbon offset projects is inherently site-specific, 
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occurring in the context of a particular ecosystem, array of cultural uses, project partners, and suite of laws and 
regulations. As the relevant legal standards and authority will differ substantially from place to place, this study 
cannot provide guidance on the legal challenges associated with any specific blue carbon offset project. Instead, 
the following guidance is intended to provide generalized considerations to assist project proponents in 
navigating the most substantial legal challenges that were identified in this study.  
• Identify All Owners of the Project Site Throughout the Offset Project Period Required for Permanence: 
Sea level rise and coastal erosion are likely to substantially change the geographic location of the 
property boundary between submerged lands and uplands as well as the location of coastal wetlands in 
upland areas. Blue carbon offset project sites are likely to need to migrate with coastal dynamics in 
order to ensure continuing sequestration benefits and avoid permanence problems, and projects that 
do not account for geographic change are at risk of violating unambiguous ownership requirements of 
voluntary carbon markets. To avoid these problems in the future, project proponents may use coastal 
change models to identify reasonable expectations for migration of the coastline and the relevant 
coastal wetland area throughout the offset project period. The expected future locations of the coast 
and wetlands can be used to identify any relevant property owners of the project site, including upland 
owners of areas where marshes may migrate and submerged lands owners who may take title to the 
current project site. Project proponents will also benefit by identifying any severed estates or competing 
property rights to the project site that could require the public landowner to accommodate 
development inconsistent with the offset project. Each of these property owners may need to waive 
their rights, including potential future offset claims, through an easement or other mechanism that 
survives transfers of property ownership in order for the unambiguous ownership and permanence 
expectations to be met. 
 
• Determine Whether and How Public Agencies Can Transfer Carbon Rights to the Project Site: The ability 
of public agencies to transfer carbon rights to a private owner is likely to be among the most substantial 
challenges to blue carbon project success. Land managers working to develop blue carbon offset 
projects thus must determine whether the relevant public agencies are authorized to alienate carbon 
rights as a property rights transaction (such as a leasehold). For agencies without explicit authority to 
transfer property rights, project proponents will require alternative mechanisms, such as non-binding 
MOAs or use of newly-acquired lands (rather than existing public lands), to ensure that the public offset 
investor has adequate ownership interest in the carbon rights to meet the requirements of the 
voluntary carbon market. For example, past FWS projects have primarily occurred on private lands 
subsequently added to the NWR system—reserving the carbon rights on those lands to the offset 
owner. Similar attention to siting and transaction structure may be able to overcome legal hurdles in 
other contexts by locating projects on inholdings or conservation lands or by using non-governmental 
foundations as part of project transactions to obligate maintenance funds for site-specific uses. 
As failure to reach agreement on the acceptable form of carbon rights transfers could effectively halt an 
offset project, determination of the structure of these transactions is an important early consideration 
for project proponents. These consultations may need to include not only the agency, investor, and 
conservation provider partners, but also carbon market representatives, to ensure that rights 
transactions satisfy market standards. Successful delineation of the structure of carbon rights transfers 
will be likely to drive project design and will thus provide important guiderails for the technical and site-
specific planned actions.  
• Address Time Limits on Public Lands Transactions: Blue carbon offset projects may require maintenance 
of sequestration for up to 100 years. This long time period is a challenge for public agencies due to 
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limitations on the term of required leaseholds or other legal agreements needed to transfer carbon 
rights for the entirety of the project period. Where limitations on transaction length are shorter than the 
period required for permanence, project proponents may need to determine whether alternative legal 
arrangements satisfy carbon markets. For example, shorter-term carbon rights transactions with a 
limited right of renewal may satisfy both carbon market standards and public land agency mandates. 
Alternatively, as for authority for transfers of carbon rights, transactions that do not require a leasehold 
or other property transaction may be required to satisfy agency mandates; in such cases, project 
proponents may need to obtain assurance from the relevant carbon market that the proposed structure 
is acceptable. 
 
• Review Site-Specific Legal Framework: While not covered in detail in this report, individual land 
management units, such as National Parks, may be subject to site-specific legislation. This legislation 
(and associated regulations) may alter factors such as what the activities allowed on individual public 
land units and how the relevant agency is required to manage the site. In addition, projects on specific 
sites are subject to additional requirements of federal, state, and/or tribal law that may not be covered 
in this report. Consideration of these site-specific requirements is necessary for successful 
implementation of projects on sites subject to these individualized management requirements.  
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Coastal wetlands play an important role in sequestering atmospheric carbon, but these ecosystems are 
under threat from sea level rise, land use conversion, and other causes.1 Restoration projects in coastal 
wetlands can both sequester “blue carbon” and enhance habitat.2 Blue carbon projects3 that meet 
requirements for the voluntary carbon market can generate tradeable carbon offsets, which have a 
monetary value and can be used to finance a portion of the restoration projects that are needed to 
generate them.4 Thus, blue carbon offset projects represent a promising tool to promote effective 
restoration and maintenance of threatened and degraded coastal wetlands. 
Legal certainty is a key hurdle to the deployment of successful blue carbon offset projects. Federal, 
state, and tribal agencies are critical partners in these projects because they control a substantial 
portion of the nation’s coastal wetlands. Land management agencies are constrained by legal 
authorities, and therefore may not be confident in their ability to use this funding mechanism absent 
explicit authorization. In the absence of such explicit authorization, agencies may benefit from an 
analytical framework to assess whether and how legal issues may affect their ability to participate in 
blue carbon offset projects.  
This study identifies key legal authorities and principles that affect whether and how government land 
management agencies can participate in blue carbon offset projects. While the principles identified here 
are applicable to any jurisdiction, this analysis focuses on a selection of federal, state, and tribal agencies 
and jurisdictions as case studies. These include the federal National Park Service and Fish and Wildlife 
Service; the states of Florida, Massachusetts, Washington, and Louisiana; and the Tulalip Tribes of 
Washington. Legal research applicable to these agencies and jurisdictions identified two primary 
categories of legal challenges:  
• Title and Property Rights: Agencies can directly control activities only on lands that they own 
and control. Coastal wetlands raise complex ownership and jurisdiction issues because they may 
straddle property and jurisdictional boundaries at the coast, and these boundaries move over 
time with changes in sea level and coastal features. In addition, these lands may be subject to 
private property rights or control even if owned by the government.  
• Legal Authority: Statutes provide government agencies with authority to carry out actions. 
Agencies cannot go beyond the authority provided by the legislature, but explicit authorization 
for them to conduct blue carbon projects is lacking. Agencies therefore must determine whether 
blue carbon projects are authorized by more general land management authority. In addition, 
blue carbon projects often require that authority to accept donations of money, labor, and land 
and the authority to transfer ownership of carbon rights from public lands to non-governmental 
entities. Authority to transfer carbon rights may pose the greatest challenge to land managers, 
as key agencies lack authority to enter into leases with private entities for this purpose. 
 
1 Elizabeth McLeod et al., A Blueprint for Blue Carbon: Toward an Improved Understanding of the Role of Vegetated Coastal 
Habitats in Sequestering CO2, 9 FRONTIERS IN ECOL. & ENV’T 552 (2011) 
2 Winnie W.Y. Lau, Beyond Carbon: Conceptualizing Payments for Ecosystem Services in Blue Forests on Carbon and Other 
Marine and Coastal Ecosystem Services, 83 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 5 (2013). 
3 This study defines a “blue carbon project” as any coastal wetland restoration project funded in whole or part through the 
generation of carbon offsets.  
4 Roger Ullman et al., Introducing Blue Carbon in Climate Market Mechanisms, 83 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 15 (2013). 
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After explaining the scope of this study in section 2, section 3 provides an overview of carbon offsets in 
the context of coastal wetlands. Section 4 examines past carbon offset and analogous projects on public 
lands. Part 5 discusses the two categories of legal challenges affecting blue carbon offset projects on 
federal, state, and tribal public lands. Finally, Part 6 concludes with guidance for land managers 
assessing legal authority to participate in blue carbon projects and in structuring these projects to avoid 
potential pitfalls.  
2 Scope of Analysis 
This study is based on legal research and analysis intended to determine whether and how federal, 
state, and tribal government agencies can participate in blue carbon offset projects on publicly owned 
coastal wetlands. It focuses on entities and locations of particular interest for blue carbon offset 
projects. These entities are not the only possible government entities with blue carbon responsibility, 
but were selected to serve as exemplars to understand and illustrate how legal principles may play out 
in practice. 
Multiple agencies have responsibility for management of public coastal wetlands in the U.S. These 
agencies can be divided into two categories: those with land management authority and those with 
regulatory authority over activities in wetlands. These divisions occur at both federal and state levels. 
At the federal level, this analysis focuses on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or “the Service”) and 
National Park Service (NPS), which are the two land management agencies expected to have the 
broadest responsibility for coastal wetlands.5 FWS manages the more than 92 million acres of the 
National Wildlife Refuge (NWR) system under the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 
1997 (NWRSIA).6 NPS manages the National Park System pursuant to the National Park Service Organic 
Act of 1916, as amended (OA, or Organic Act).7 Wetlands actions under federal law must be consistent 
with these agencies’ land management authority and may be subject to permitting by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) under section 404 of the Clean Water Act and/or section 10 of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act.8  
State land management echoes that at the federal level, with multiple agencies with land management 
authority and wetlands regulatory authority. This study uses Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and 
Washington as examples to illustrate how state land management may interface with blue carbon offset 
programs. These states were selected because they have substantial acreage of public coastal wetlands 
and are drawn from diverse geographies and legal traditions. The responsible agencies and relevant 
authority follow. 
• The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board) holds state lands, 
including coastal wetlands, in trust for the public.9 These lands are administered by the Florida 
 
5 Four agencies manage 94% of federal lands. GORDON SMITH, CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, FOREST OFFSET PROJECTS ON FEDERAL LANDS 7-8 
(2012). In addition to FWS and NPS, these include BLM, which manages public lands not included in a specific unit pursuant to 
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-87, and the U.S. Forest Service, which manages the National Forest System and National Grasslands 
pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 472A-1614. 
6 Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd. 
7 Pub. L. No. 62-235, 39 Stat. 535, codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101 et seq.  
8 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 403. 
9 FL. STAT. §§ 253.001, 253.03 (vesting in the Board, inter alia, “swamp and overflowed lands,” “lands owned by the state by 
right of its sovereignty, “tidal lands,” and “lands covered by shallow waters”). Certain lands, such as transportation corridors 
and water management district lands, are not vested in the Board. Id. § 253.03. 
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Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) Division of State Lands, except where 
responsibility has been delegated to another entity, such as a water management district, the 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, or the FDEP Aquatic Preserve Program.10 
FDEP also regulates activities in wetlands.11  
• The Louisiana Office of State Lands (OSL), within the state Division of Administration, 
administers public lands, including water bottoms, in the state.12 The Office of State Parks (OSP) 
manages protected state lands, including state parks, preservation areas, and preservation 
sites.13 Projects involving the use of state-owned lands or water bottoms are subject to the 
coastal use permitting program, which is administered by the Department of Natural Resources 
(LDNR) Office of Coastal Management under the Louisiana State and Local Coastal Resources 
Management Act (LCRMA).14  
• Massachusetts state lands are held by several agencies, including the Division of Conservation 
and Recreation (DCR) within the state Department of Environmental Management (recreation 
lands)15 and the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife within the Department of Fish and Game 
(MassWildlife) (wildlife management areas, wildlife sanctuaries, and nature preserves).16 
Activities that may affect wetlands on state lands are subject to the Massachusetts Wetlands 
Protection Act, which is administered by municipal Conservation Commissions under the 
oversight of the state Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP).17  
• Public lands in Washington are managed by the Department of Natural Resources (WDNR), 
including state lands, forest lands, and aquatic lands.18 Other state-owned lands are managed by 
different entities, including the State Parks and Recreation Commission (state parks and 
parkways)19 and the Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) (wildlife areas, water access 
areas, and working lands).20 The Washington Department of Ecology (WDE) manages wetlands 
permitting in Washington pursuant to the state Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) and 
Shoreline Management Act (SMA).21  
Blue carbon projects on tribal lands raise additional unique issues. Tribal law is sui generis22 (unique) and 
raises challenging legal issues that are often unique to particular tribes and may differ substantially 
 
10 Id. §§ 253.002; 375.031 (“All land, water areas, and related resources hereafter needed by the state for outdoor recreation, 
wildlife management, forestry management, nature preservation, water conservation and control, and other similar or related 
purposes shall be acquired by the Division of State Lands of the Department of Environmental Protection pursuant to the 
procedures set forth in chapter 253.”). 
11 See ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, FLORIDA STATE WETLAND PROGRAM SUMMARY 3-5 (2015) (providing overview of state 
regulation of wetlands). 
12 LA. STAT. §§ 41:1, 41:14 (water bottoms), 41:1701-1714 (management of water bottoms). 
13 LA. STAT. §§ 56:1682 (purpose of OSP), 1684 (classifications of lands under OSP authority). 
14 LA. STAT. § 49:214.21 et seq. 
15 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 1 (“The division of state parks and recreation shall have control over the state parks, forests, 
parkways, waterways, rinks, pools, beaches and other recreational lands and facilities”). 
16 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, §§ 1A, 6 (wildlife sanctuaries), 10A (nature preserves); 321 Mass. Code Regs. 3.01 (wildlife 
management areas). 
17 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 40. 
18 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.02.010 (defining public lands), 79.105.010 (aquatic lands); see also id. § 79.02.010 (“‘Aquatic lands’ 
means all state-owned tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters as defined in RCW 79.105.060 that 
are administered by the department.”). 
19 Id. § 79A.05.020. 
20 Id. § 77.12.037; see also WDFW Lands, WDFW, https://wdfw.wa.gov/about/wdfw-lands (describing land units).  
21 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.48.030 (jurisdiction under Water Pollution Control Act), 90.58.020 (Shoreline Management Act 
findings). 
22 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
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based on geography, treaty status, treaty language, and other factors. A comprehensive evaluation of 
tribal authority related to blue carbon projects therefore would require intensive analysis that would be 
beyond the scope of this study. Instead, this study attempts to highlight key legal issues relevant to 
tribal authority and considers the laws of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington as an example of how these 
general principles may play out in practice.  
The scope of the analysis presented here is necessarily limited in substantive breadth as well as 
geography. First, this analysis focuses only on key provisions of applicable legal authority that relate 
directly to the legality of offset activities. The vast potential array of project designs, environmental 
contexts, effects on non-governmental agencies, and interpretation of these factors by decision-makers 
precludes any attempt at a comprehensive overview. To avoid missing authority that is important in the 
context of a particular project and to focus on those issues that are most directly relevant, this analysis 
avoids any attempt at completeness. 
Second, the analysis focuses on the legality of offset projects from the perspective of land management 
agencies. That is, it considers whether government land management agencies are authorized by law to 
participate in blue carbon offset projects on their land independent of permitting. Thus, this analysis 
largely excludes detailed analysis of wetlands permitting or other environmental planning and 
permitting requirements. This limitation recognizes that wetlands restoration—including blue carbon 
offset projects—is consistent with the goals and requirements of wetlands protection law. Approval of 
projects under these laws may be lengthy and challenging in particular instances, and careful project 
design and consultation is needed to ensure that these permits issue in a timely and effective manner. 
However, this analysis presumes that restoration projects are capable of approval under these 
conditions.  
Third, this analysis does not address community partnerships or associated liability in blue carbon offset 
projects. The success of carbon offsets projects often turns not only on legal authority of the 
government land manager, but on factors such as acceptance and participation by abutting private 
landowners or unrelated agencies (e.g., Departments of Transportation for culvert replacement).23 
These factors are extremely complex, highly location-, jurisdiction-, and project-specific, and may turn 
on personal, political, or financial considerations rather than legal authority. This analysis therefore 
avoids speculating or generalizing about these factors in this study. 
Finally, this analysis does not evaluate potential conformity of blue carbon projects on public lands to 
specific carbon offset standards. At least one prior assessment has assessed whether and how particular 
types of public lands projects interface with specific standards.24 This study does not attempt a similar 
assessment, as results may differ based on the provisions of various voluntary and regulatory offset 
market standards. Instead, this study focuses on the authority of government regulators to enter into 
transactions that meet relevant, generally-applicable offset principles, as set forth below.25 
 
23 See, e.g., Herring River Tidal Restoration Project, NPS CAPE COD NATIONAL SEASHORE, 
https://www.nps.gov/caco/learn/nature/herring-river-tidal-restoration-project.htm (describing project complexity). 
24 SMITH, supra note 5 (assessing forestry projects under Climate Action Reserve standard). 
25 While demonstration of real sequestration under applicable standards and methodologies in blue carbon offset projects on 
public lands may pose practical challenges, this issue is unlikely to pose legal hurdles as public land management agencies have 
broad authority to engage in restoration activities, as discussed in part 5.2 below. In addition, this study assumes that 
transactions can assure access to public lands for verification purposes. If carbon rights can be transferred to private entities by 
governments, those governments surely also will be authorized to provide guaranteed access to private sites for monitoring 
and verification. See id. (“verification of GHG reductions resulting from federal forestlands need not be problematic”). 
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• Additionality: “GHG reductions must be additional to any that would have occurred in the 
absence of . . . a market for GHG reductions.”26 
• Permanence: “[A]ny net reversal in GHG reductions used to offset emissions must be fully 
accounted for and compensated through the achievement of additional reductions.”27  
• Unambiguous ownership: “No parties other than the registered project developer must be able 
to reasonably claim ownership of the GHG reductions.”28 
These principles are addressed where appropriate in the sections that follow. 
3 Blue Carbon Offsets: Overview 
Coastal wetlands are valuable, but threatened, habitats that require investment in restoration and long-
term maintenance. Coastal wetlands, such as mangroves, tidal salt marsh, and seagrass, provide a range 
of benefits to society, such as flood protection, supporting sustainable fisheries, and improving water 
quality by filtering water pollution.29 However, sea level rise, land use conversion, and other problems 
are causing the loss and degradation of coastal wetlands, undermining the ecosystem services and other 
benefits they provide to society.30 Maintenance and restoration of coastal wetlands therefore are 
needed to protect and enhance these habitats today and in the decades to come.31 
Carbon offsets can be an important tool for coastal wetland restoration funding. While a variety of 
grants and funding sources support coastal wetlands restoration,32 these sources may not meet 
restoration project needs.33 Proponents therefore may need to identify alternative or supplemental 
funding sources for restoration projects to succeed. A variety of arrangements, broadly known as 
“payments for ecosystem services” (PES),34 can provide funding for restoration through market 
mechanisms. This study focuses on one type of PES: the carbon offset. Kollmuss et al. describe carbon 
offsets as follows: “By paying someone else to absorb or avoid the release of a tonne of CO2 elsewhere, 
the purchaser of a carbon offset can aim to compensate for or, in principle, ‘offset’ their own 
emissions.”35 In the wetlands context, carbon offsets allow external funders to pay for restoration 
activities that sequester carbon.  
 
26 Id. at 5-6. 
27 Id. at 6. 
28 Id. 
29 T.E. DAHL & S.M. STEDMAN, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE COASTAL 
WATERSHEDS OF THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 2004 TO 2009 6 (2013). 
30 Elizabeth McLeod et al., A Blueprint for Blue Carbon: Toward an Improved Understanding of the Role of Vegetated Coastal 
Habitats in Sequestering CO2, 9 FRONTIERS IN ECOL. & ENV’T 552 (2011) 
31 See Kevin L. Erwin, Wetlands and global climate change: the role of wetland restoration in a changing world, 17 WETLANDS 
ECOL. MGMT. 71 (2008) (discussing long-term restoration and management needs for wetlands in a changing world).  
32 See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Federal Funding for Wetlands, https://www.epa.gov/wetlands/federal-funding-wetlands (listing 
funding sources).  
33 Lau, supra note 2, at 5 (“[A] common and frequent barrier to achieving full effectiveness and wider adoption of [marine and 
coastal resource management] tools is the lack of adequate financing.”) 
34 Definitions of PES are disputed, but include “(1) voluntary transactions (2) between service users (3) and service providers (4) 
that are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management (5) for generating offsite services.” Sven Wunder, 
Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services, 117 ECOL. ECON. 234, 241 (2015). 
35 ANJA KOLLMUSS, HELGE ZINK & CLIFFORD POLYCARP, STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE & TRICORONA, MAKING SENSE OF THE VOLUNTARY 
CARBON MARKET: A COMPARISON OF CARBON OFFSET STANDARDS 1 (2008). 
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Coastal wetlands have significant carbon offset potential. Wetlands are important carbon sinks: up to 
40% of their soils may be carbon, and they hold 20-30% of all soil carbon on the planet.36 Coastal 
wetlands thus absorb a substantial amount of atmospheric carbon and sequester this “blue carbon” for 
long periods.37 Because of their effectiveness in sequestering carbon, coastal wetlands can offset 
substantial amounts of carbon, providing a strong economic basis for offset projects.38 However, a 
metanalysis suggests that “blue carbon projects are not usually commercially attractive propositions” 
for purely private investment due to “institutional, administrative, and financial constraints.”39 As a 
result, blue carbon projects are most likely to be attractive when project partners are motivated not 
only by a project’s climate mitigation benefits, but also by co-benefits such as habitat conservation, 
fisheries enhancement, or water pollution control.40 Projects to restore publicly-owned coastal wetlands 
fit these conditions, as government agencies’ motivations extend beyond profit and include co-benefits 
produced by restoration. 
Demand for carbon offsets may result from mandatory or voluntary controls on greenhouse gas 
emissions.41 Mandatory programs, also known as “compliance markets,” are created by legal authorities 
that establish cap-and-trade programs or otherwise require entities to offset certain greenhouse gas 
emissions.42 For example, the California Emissions Trading Program (ETP), established under the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,43 creates a cap on emissions by covered entities, but 
allows these entities to offset up to 8% of their compliance obligations through independently verified 
projects using approved protocols.44 While efforts to develop an approved protocol for blue carbon 
projects under the California ETP were reportedly underway in 2014,45 the state has not approved such 
a protocol to date,46 so blue carbon projects cannot participate in this offset market to date. Studies 
suggest that blue carbon projects are also ineligible or limited in other compliance markets.47 As a result, 
voluntary markets appear to be the primary mechanism for blue carbon offset projects at this time. 
Voluntary offsets are not required by law. Instead, voluntary markets “cater[] to individuals, companies 
or governments who seek to buy carbon credits to voluntarily offset their own greenhouse-gas 
emissions although many of the participants in the voluntary market are buying credits in anticipation of 
 
36 A.M. Nahlik & M.S. Fennessy, Carbon Storage in US Wetlands, 7 NATURE COMM. 13835, doi: 10.1038/ncomms13835, at 2 
(2016), citing WETLAND SOILS (M. J. Vepraskas & C. B. Craft, eds., 2d ed. 2016). 
37 See generally Mcleod et al., supra note 1 (reviewing importance of blue carbon in sequestering carbon). 
38 Sebastian Thomas, Blue Carbon: Knowledge Gaps, Critical Issues, and Novel Approaches, 107 ECOL. ECON. 22, 30-31 (2014) 
(“Preliminary biophysical and economic analysis of net present values (NPV) . . . of blue carbon resources globally suggests that 
protection might be viable at moderate carbon prices . . . and yield substantial positive mitigation and adaptation outcomes.”). 
39 Id. at 32. 
40 Id. 
41 See generally Marco Kerste, Jarst Weda & Nicole Rosenboom, SEO ECON. RES., CARBON TRADING: LITERATURE OVERVIEW (2010) 
(providing overview of carbon markets). 
42 See Ullman et al., supra note 4, at 15 (“a central authority sets a limit, or cap, on the amount of a greenhouse gas that can be 
emitted, and the cap is allocated or sold to entities in the form of credits which represent the right to emit a specific volume of 
the gas. The emitting entities are required to hold a number of credits equivalent to their actual emissions, and the total 
amount of existing credits cannot exceed the cap. Entities may then trade credits among themselves if they need to increase 
their emissions or have been able to reduce emissions.”). 
43 A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat. ch. 488, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 et seq. 
44 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95800-96022; see also Compliance Offset Program, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, 
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm.  
45 Ullman et al., supra note 4, at 16. 
46 Compliance Offset Program, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm (listing approved 
protocols 
47 Lindsay Wylie, Ariana E. Sutton-Grier & Amber Moore, Keys to Successful Blue Carbon Projects: Lessons Learned from Global 
Case Studies, 65 MARINE POL’Y 76, 83 (2016). 
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future compliance markets.”48 Voluntary markets standards currently recognize blue carbon projects, 
allowing them to generate offsets. For example, the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) recognizes 
“Wetlands Restoration and Conservation” (WRC) as an eligible project category, including for both 
“restoring wetlands ecosystems” and “conservation of intact wetlands.”49 No WRC projects have been 
completed to date in the United States, although projects in terrestrial wetlands habitats—notably, 
bottomland hardwood areas of the lower Mississippi River valley—have occurred under the VCS 
afforestation project category.50 Future WRC projects will need to conform to all applicable VCS 
requirements, such as demonstrating that they have the legal right to control and implement 
restoration activities51 and to ensure that the promised sequestration benefits are achieved over time 
(permanence).52 This study focuses on voluntary blue carbon offset projects, although the 
considerations discussed below would likely remain relevant in the context of a mandatory offset 
program. 
4 Past Projects on Public Lands 
Blue carbon offset projects may have their greatest impact on public lands for several reasons. First, as 
noted previously, economic studies indicate that blue carbon offsets are most justifiable when co-
benefits are valued in addition to financial benefits, a condition that may not apply to private 
conservation agreements.53 Indeed, many of the past afforestation projects registered under the VCS or 
other voluntary standards have occurred on NWR lands or inholdings.54 Second, governments have 
robust ownership interests in coastal wetlands. Federal, state, and tribal governments own a substantial 
proportion of the upland coastal wetlands in the United States.55 As discussed in section 5.1 below, 
states also own submerged and intertidal lands and manage these areas in the public trust. As a result, 
governments can be expected to be necessary partners in future blue carbon offset projects. 
While no blue carbon offset projects on public lands were identified in the research for this project, past 
afforestation offset projects on public lands can illustrate how governments have structured carbon 
offset projects in a similar context. Research for this study identified several offset projects conducted in 
partnership with the FWS and a few projects with tribal governments,56 but none with NPS or other 
 
48 Ullman et al., supra note 4, at 16. 
49 VERRA, VCS STANDARD 58-59 (v.4.0, 2019). 
50 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOCH ET AL., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, BAYOU BARTHOLOMEW PROJECT: VCS PROJECT DESCRIPTION (2011) (describing 
project in bottomland hardwood habitat).  
51 Id. §§ 3.6 
52 Id. § 3.2.11 (“WRC projects shall demonstrate that the permanence of their soil carbon stock will be maintained. The 
maximum quantity of GHG emission reductions that may be claimed by the project is limited to the difference between project 
and baseline scenario after a 100-year time frame . . .”).  
53 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Projects on private lands may meet these conditions in some cases, as where lands 
are owned by conservation organizations. However, these instances may be distinguished from offset projects implemented 
purely for entrepreneurial motives, as is common in wetlands mitigation banking. See Elan L. Spanjer, Swamp Money: The 
Opportunity and Uncertainty of Investing in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 371, 387 (2018) (noting private 
investment driver for growth of wetlands mitigation banking market: “An influx of capital investment into bank development 
has fueled the growth of mitigation banking activity, as investors and entrepreneurs have flocked to the market with hopes of 
capturing a share of the estimated $1.3-$2.2 billion annual market for wetland mitigation credits.”). 
54 See, e.g., THE CONSERVATION FUND, RESTORING A LEGACY AT RED RIVER NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (2009) (describing afforestation project 
on inholdings within Red River NWR pursuant to Climate, Conservation & Biodiversity Standards); JAMES M. EATON ET AL., 
TERRACARBON, REFORESTATION ACROSS THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI VALLEY (2011) (describing VCS project conducted exclusively on federal 
and state public lands). 
55 Rebecca Epanchin-Niell et al., Threatened Protection: Sea Level Rise and Coastal Protected Lands of the Eastern United States, 
137 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 118 (2017). 
56 Yurok Tribe, Yurok Tribe Sustainable Forest Project, California Air Resources Board Project CAFR0064, 
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/earlyaction/projects.htm (database of listed early action projects). 
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federal agencies or with state governments. The small number of past offset projects identified have 
been structured in two ways: (i) projects on private lands that are subsequently transferred to public or 
tribal ownership; and (ii) projects on lands already owned by the public or tribe. This section describes 
the structure of selected transactions, which are likely models for future transactions involving public 
lands, including coastal wetlands, as well as compensatory mitigation projects on state wetlands, which 
may be a useful model for future state blue carbon offset projects. 
4.1 Afforestation Offset Projects on National Wildlife Refuge Lands 
FWS has been involved in carbon offset projects since 1998.57 “Early in the Service’s carbon 
sequestration program, partners simply restored natural vegetation on highly degraded lands already 
owned by the service.”58 More recently, however, FWS has partnered with energy companies who fund 
restoration of privately-owned lands and donate them to the Service with funding for maintenance 
while retaining the carbon offsets generated by the project.59 As of 2010, FWS claimed that such 
transactions in the lower Mississippi River valley had added more than “40,000 acres of habitat to the 
National Wildlife Refuge System and restored more than 80,000 acres with more than 22 million trees, 
sequestering 30 million metric tons of carbon over … [a] 70-year [period].”60 These transactions indicate 
the potential scale of offset transactions on federal lands. 
The “Tensas River National Wildlife Refuge Afforestation Project” is a good example of how offset 
projects have been structured on private lands. This project began when a timber company sought to 
sell about 11,000 acres of land around the Refuge.61 FWS could not afford the asking price, so the Trust 
for Public Land (TPL) agreed to buy the tract and convey it piecemeal to FWS.62 TPL purchased the land 
with funding from investors including energy companies (Entergy Corporation, Detroit Edison), 
foundations (National Fish and Wildlife Foundation), and a voluntary offset re-seller (Carbonfund.org).63 
TPL contracted with Environmental Synergy, Inc to restore the tracts, then sought to transfer them to 
FWS, with carbon rights retained by investors for 99 years.64 Carbonfund.org then certified the amount 
of greenhouse gas benefit on certain lands under the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard 
(CCBS).65 Thus, the project leveraged investment by investors seeking to offset emissions to fund 
acquisition and restoration of lands then transferred to the public for long-term stewardship. 
The legal structure of the Tensas River NWR transaction was designed to satisfy the needs of carbon 
markets. The three parties to the transaction—FWS, TPL, and Carbonfund.org—signed two Memoranda 
of Agreement (MOA)—one for each of two tracts involved66—establishing Carbonfund.org’s legal rights 
to the carbon offset, necessary project approvals, and other content.67 Unfortunately, the text of these 
MOAs is not publicly available, nor are similar documents for similar transactions. However, comments 
 
57 ERKIN ÖZBERK & BRIAN MCFARLAND, CARBONFUND.ORG, TENSAS RIVER NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE AFFORESTATION PROJECT 34 (2009) 
58 FWS, CARBON SEQUESTRATION: RESTORING NATIVE WILDLIFE HABITAT AND CAPTURING CARBON 2 (2010). 
59 Id. 
60 FWS, RISING TO THE URGENT CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESPONDING TO ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (2010).  
61 Bill O’Brian, FWS, Leadership with a Capital P (Perseverance) (Apr. 12, 2011), 
https://www.fws.gov/refuges/refugeupdate/MarchApril_2011/capitalp.html 
62 Id.  
63 ÖZBERK & MCFARLAND, supra note 57, at 6. 
64 Id. at 7. 
65 Id. at 4. 
66 Id. at 22. 
67 Id. at 34-36. 
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from TPL indicate that the MOAs serve critical functions from an offset market standpoint, including 
that: 
• afforestation prior to government acquisition avoids potential financial and legal requirements 
that threaten additionality;  
• federal ownership of the land subject to management requirements in the MOA provides 
permanence; 
• the MOA requires FWS to allow TPL to access the site to conduct measurement, monitoring, and 
verification, including for replanting as needed to avoid reversals.68 
Some carbon offset projects have occurred on lands already within NWRs. For example, Entergy 
Corporation submitted a project entitled “Restoration of Bottomland Hardwood Forests at National 
Wildlife Refuges in the South Central US” to the American Carbon Registry in 2011.69 The project 
restored planted areas of four NWRs in Arkansas and Louisiana, some but not all of which were in the 
Refuge system prior to the project.70 Carbon offset rights were claimed by Entergy, and other project 
partners acknowledged and agreed not to claim the carbon rights, via a series of MOAs for each 
Refuge.71 While the complete MOAs are not available to the public, the project documentation includes 
excerpts, including the following language for lands in Overflow NWR owned by FWS prior to the 
project:  
“This Agreement documents the understanding of the parties regarding the transfer of 
the Acquired Reforestation Tract to the Service, the planting and management of the 
Acquired Reforestation Tract, management of the Refuge Reforestation Tract by the 
Service, and the donations made and to be made by Entergy and The Conservation Fund 
under the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956. The donations from Entergy are made expressly 
subject to the condition that Entergy reserves the right to report and may report, on its 
behalf and for its affiliates, sequestered carbon associated with the trees planted on the 
Acquired Reforestation Tract and the Refuge Reforestation Tract.”72 
This language provides conclusory evidence regarding the structure of the carbon rights arrangement on 
both existing Refuge lands and acquired lands to be newly added to the Refuge system. However, the 
excerpted language does not contain sufficient detail on the authority for FWS action to enable a 
meaningful assessment of how this agreement was structured and its relationship to legal limitations on 
FWS actions. However, the MOA was signed by FWS and thus suggests that the Service and its counsel 
were satisfied by the legality of this transaction. 
4.2 Compensatory Mitigation on Public Wetlands  
Compensatory mitigation may be a useful analogue for future carbon offset projects on state wetlands. 
Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) requires a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of 
 
68 Public Comment by Jad Daley, Climate Conservation Program Director, TPL, regarding Climate Action Reserve White Paper: 
Forest Offsets on Federal Lands (July 18, 2012), http://www.climateactionreserve.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Federal-
Lands-White-Paper-Public-Comment-TTPL.pdf.  
69 TERRACARBON LLC, ENTERGY CORP., RESTORATION OF BOTTOMLAND HARDWOOD FORESTS AT NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL 
US (2011) (on file). 
70 Id. at 19. 
71 Id. at 79-80. Lands later added to the Red River NWR were transferred by contract to which FWS was not a party. Other 
transactions used MOAs signed by FWS. Id. 
72 Id. at 80. 
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Engineers (USACE) to discharge “dredge or fill” material into wetlands.73 “In order for a project to be 
permitted, it must be demonstrated that, to the extent practicable: steps have been taken to avoid 
impacts to wetlands and other aquatic resources, potential impacts have been minimized, and 
compensation will be provided for any remaining unavoidable impacts.”74 Compensation may take four 
forms: (i) restoration of an existing wetland; (ii) enhancement of an existing wetland; (iii) establishment 
of a new wetland; or (iv) preservation of an existing wetland.75 Compensatory mitigation can be 
provided through: “permittee-responsible compensatory mitigation, mitigation banks and in-lieu fee 
mitigation.”76 These mechanisms—and particularly mitigation banks—are structured in a similar manner 
to carbon offset projects described above.  
Federal compensatory mitigation projects may be located on public lands, despite criticisms of this 
structure. Commentators have noted critiques of mitigation projects on public lands based on unfair 
competition with private mitigation banks and additionality failures because the public wetlands are 
expected to be conserved without the mitigation funding.77 USACE and EPA rejected these arguments 
and declined to limit compensatory mitigation on public lands.78 “As long as mitigation banks or in-lieu 
fee projects established on public lands provide environmental benefits over and above what normal 
management activities provide, there should be no conflict. Credits secured by private developers can 
provide a source of income for public entities to conduct . . . activities that could not be done under 
their current budgets.”79 The rule also declined to require governments to provide long-term financing 
for all mitigation sites, though it noted that financing will often be required in practice.80 Thus, federal 
rules endorse compensatory mitigation as a valuable conservation tool that provides wetland 
management benefits that otherwise would not arise. However, additional policy development may be 
needed to clarify when and how mitigation is allowed on public lands, such as by excluding the value of 
public land to ensure parity with mitigation on private land.81  
States also endorse compensatory mitigation on public lands. Many states have established their own 
requirements requiring compensatory mitigation and authorizing mitigation banking.82 These statutes 
authorize compensatory mitigation on some public lands. For example, Florida law directs “the 
department [of environmental protection] and the water management districts . . . to participate in and 
 
73 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
74 SANDRA S. NICHOLS, JARED THOMPSON & JESSICA WILKINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, THE FEDERAL WETLAND PERMITTING PROGRAM: 
AVOIDANCE AND MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012). 
75 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008). 
76 Id. 
77 Harold Levral, Pierre Scemama & Anne-Charlotte Vaissiere, Should We Be Wary of Mitigation Banking? Evidence Regarding 
the Risks Associated with this Wetland Offset Arrangement in Florida, 135 ECOL. ECON. 136, 146 (2017). 
78 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,632 (Apr. 10, 2008) (“We believe it is 
appropriate, in some instances, to site compensatory mitigation projects on public lands, where they are consistent with the 
use and management of the public land, and the credits are based solely on aquatic resource functions provided by the 
compensatory mitigation project, over and above those provided by public programs already planned or in place.”). Other 
agencies, such as NOAA, may limit mitigation on public lands under separate policies to ensure parity with mitigation on private 
land and other reasons. 
79 Id. at 19,649. 
80 Id. at 19,649 (“In cases where compensatory mitigation project sites are owned by public entities, it may not be necessary to 
include provisions for the financing of any required long-term management if, for example, a formal, documented commitment 
from a government agency is provided.”). 
81 See MARTIN DOYLE ET AL., COMPENSATORY MITIGATION ON FEDERAL LANDS, Duke Univ. Nicholas Inst. Pub. NI R 20-02 (2020) (reviewing 
federal agency authority and practice for compensatory mitigation on public lands and recommending actions to improve 
program implementation).  
82 See, e.g., LA. STAT. § 49:214.41; FL. STAT. § 373.4135; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.84. 
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encourage the establishment of private and public mitigation banks and offsite regional mitigation.”83 
While authorizing compensatory mitigation on public lands, the statute also limits agency authority to 
conduct compensatory mitigation for projects for other entities84 and provides requirements for what 
must be included in MOAs establishing mitigation projects on public lands.85 Thus, state legislatures 
have provided explicit authority for this activity that is tailored to specific concerns about its use on 
public lands—authority which is absent in the carbon offset context, as described in section 5.2 below.  
Carbon offsets, unlike federal and state wetlands compensatory mitigation, lack explicit statutory 
authority. In the absence of such authority, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a policy in 
2018 disclaiming authority to conduct compensatory management on its lands pursuant to the Federal 
Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).86 Recent work by Justin Pidot, however, has challenged this 
conclusion as a matter of law, noting that BLM has ample authority to engage in compensatory 
mitigation on its lands under the general mandates provided in FLPMA.87 In the absence of explicit 
statutory authority for carbon offsets on public lands, offset projects occupy a position similar to 
compensatory mitigation under FLPMA, such that the legal status of these projects may be uncertain. 
The next section considers legal principles affecting whether and how blue carbon offsets may be legally 
authorized in the absence of explicit statutory authority. 
5 Legal Challenges Affecting Blue Carbon Offset Projects on Public Lands 
This section discusses six potential legal hurdles to the successful implementation of blue carbon offset 
projects on publicly-owned coastal wetlands. These include: (i) who has title to the project site; (ii) 
whether property boundaries will change during the project period; (iii) whether severed or competing 
property interests exist on the site; (iv) whether the responsible agency is authorized by statute to 
undertake or participate in blue carbon projects on coastal wetlands; (v) whether and how agencies can 
accept donations of money, land, and labor necessary for blue carbon transactions to occur; and (vi) 
whether agencies can transfer carbon rights generated by offset programs to private entities. The 
answers to these questions may differ for federal, state, and tribal governments and agencies and for 
different transaction structures. Therefore, this section presents an overview of the legal principles 
affecting each of these issues, how they may interact with blue carbon offset projects, and offer 
examples from the agencies discussed in section 1 above. 
5.1 Title and Property Rights 
In order to conduct a blue carbon project on publicly-owned coastal wetlands, the responsible 
government must have the legal title to the project site and the right to carry out the project in a 
manner consistent with the requirements of the carbon markets. Issues of title can be complex for 
coastal wetlands, which often straddle property boundaries, where property boundaries move over 
time, and where public rights to property may be limited. This section evaluates how these property 
 
83 FL. STAT. § 373.4135 (emphasis added) (“The Legislature intends that the provisions for establishing mitigation banks apply 
equally to both public and private entities, except that the rules of the department and water management districts may set 
forth different measures governing financial responsibility, and different measures governing legal interest, needed to ensure 
the construction and perpetual protection of a mitigation bank.”). 
84 Id. § 373.4135(1)(b) (providing that, except in listed circumstances, “a governmental entity may not create or provide 
mitigation for a project other than its own unless the governmental entity uses land that was not previously purchased for 
conservation and . . . provides the same financial assurances as required for mitigation banks.”) 
85 Id. § 373.4135(6). 
86 See Justin Pidot, The Bureau of Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2n.3 (2019) 
(linking to now-removed website, cached at https://perma.cc/AFT4-YSKK).  
87 Id.; see also Justin Pidot, Compensatory Mitigation and Public Lands, B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3352902.   
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boundaries are delineated at the shore, how they change over time, and how competing property rights 
may hinder blue carbon projects on federal, state, and tribal lands. 
5.1.1 Property Boundaries at the Shoreline 
Public lands are held by the governments in trust for their citizens.88 Governments exert broad authority 
over their lands as property owners; for example, the federal government enjoys “plenary power” over 
its lands under the U.S. Constitution.89 However, government property powers do not apply beyond 
property boundaries. One of these boundaries is the high water mark at the shore, which, in most 
states, separates upland property from state property.  
States hold legal title to submerged lands under statutory and constitutional law. The Submerged Lands 
Act (SLA) transferred title and most management authority over submerged coastal lands from the 
federal government to the states.90 Under the SLA, states have “title to and ownership of the lands 
beneath navigable waters” from mean high tide to the seaward state boundary.91 States retain 
ownership of additional submerged lands under the “equal footing doctrine,”92 which vests them with 
title over the beds of navigable waters landward of the mean high water line and “waters subject to ebb 
and flow of the tide but that are not navigable in fact when they are indirectly influenced by the tides.”93 
Under these authorities, federal property ends at the mean high water line, where state property 
ownership begins. Thus, a coastal wetland under federal ownership that includes both uplands and 
submerged lands, such as a mangrove area, may include both federal and state property. 
In some cases, the federal government may own submerged lands as a result of reservation prior to 
statehood or cession or dedication by the state after statehood. Under the equal footing doctrine, 
submerged lands clearly reserved by the federal government prior to statehood are not vested in the 
state upon statehood.94 For example, Florida did not take possession of lands granted by Spain to 
private individuals prior to the Treaty of Cession between the U.S. and Spain in 1821, nor did it take 
lands validly conveyed by the federal government between that treaty and 1845, when Florida achieved 
statehood.95 Similarly, the SLA excludes from state ownership any lands “all lands expressly retained by 
or ceded to the United States when the State entered the Union,” as well as acquired lands and certain 
other lands.96 In some cases, the federal government may have retained submerged lands; for example, 
the Supreme Court held that the federal government retained the lands under Glacier Bay National Park 
prior to Alaskan statehood.97 States may also cede or sell submerged lands back to the federal 
government after statehood, often as part of a public land preservation effort. For example, Florida 
 
88 See U.S. v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890). 
89 U.S. CONST. art. 2, cl.4; see Pidot, supra note 87 (discussing history of federal public lands management); Collins v. Yosemite 
Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938) (holding that national parks are federal enclaves). 
90 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315. 
91 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1301 (definition of “lands beneath navigable waters). The seaward state boundary is 3 nautical miles from 
the “coast line” except in Texas and the east coast of Florida, where it is 3 marine leagues from the baseline. 
92 U.S. v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (“[T]he ownership of land under navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty. As a 
general principle, the Federal Government holds such lands in trust for future States, to be granted to such States when they 
enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an “equal footing” with the established States. After a State enters the Union, title 
to the land is governed by state law.” (internal citations omitted)). 
93 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 120 (2019). 
94 U.S. v. Montana, 450 U.S. at 551-52 (discussing presumption against conveyance of submerged lands). 
95 Glenn J. MacGrady, Florida’s Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What are They, Who Owns Them, and Where is the Boundary?, 1 
Fla. St. L. Rev. 596, 598 (1973). 
96 43 U.S.C. § 1313. 
97 Alaska v. U.S., 545 U.S. 75 (2005).  
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dedicated submerged lands for inclusion in Biscayne National Park in Florida,98 and the state purchased 
and dedicated land for inclusion in Everglades National Park.99 As a result, the property status of specific 
tracts of federal coastal wetlands requires careful consideration of title to determine the boundaries, if 
any, between federal and state lands. 
Tribal property boundaries are also affected by the equal footing doctrine. In U.S. v. Montana, the 
Supreme Court held in 1981 that the state took title to the bed and banks of the Big Horn River within 
the Crow reservation upon statehood, such that the Crow nation cannot regulate hunting and fishing by 
non-Indians on these lands.100 Courts have upheld tribal title to submerged lands within reservations in 
specific cases where the waters at issue were included in federal-tribal negotiations and treaties,101 but 
the court in U.S. and Montana did not identify these factors in the Treaty of Fort Laramie, establishing 
the Crow Reservation:  
Whatever property rights the language of the 1868 treaty created, however, its language is not 
strong enough to overcome the presumption against the sovereign's conveyance of the 
riverbed. The treaty in no way expressly referred to the riverbed, nor was an intention to convey 
the riverbed expressed in “clear and especial words,” or “definitely declared or otherwise made 
very plain[.]102 
Following the holding in U.S. v. Montana, the Ninth Circuit (west coast) established a 3-part test to 
determine whether treaties intended to reserve lands to the tribe. Under this test, the tribe will retain 
submerged lands “where a grant of real property to an Indian tribe includes within its boundaries a 
navigable water and the grant is made to a tribe dependent on the fishery resource in that water for 
survival, the grant must be construed to include the submerged lands if the Government was plainly 
aware of the vital importance of the submerged lands and the water resource to the tribe at the time of 
the grant.”103 Lands retained by tribes under this test may include those under both tidal and non-tidal 
waters.104 Under these authorities, careful consideration of the treaty or other reserved rights of the 
tribe, tribal history, and U.S. government knowledge are critical factors in determining whether a 
particular tribe has title to submerged lands on or bordering its reservation, including coastal wetlands. 
The 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott, which established the reservation for the Tulalip Tribes, provides a 
useful illustration of how tribal sovereignty over submerged lands has been evaluated under the 9th 
Circuit test. In U.S. v. Aam, the court resolved a claim to exclusive ownership of tidelands of the Port 
Madison Reservation by the Suquamish tribe under the treaty. It found that the treaty met the first 
prong of the test by including a grant of real property that includes navigable water. The treaty language 
does not reference submerged coastal waters, but does include coastal lands, islands, and a creek.105 As 
this prong only requires the grant be capable of being interpreted to include submerged lands, the court 
 
98 NPS, BISCAYNE NATIONAL PARK, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 207-08 (2014). 
99 ALICIA BURTNER, NPS, MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS WILDERNESS CORE ELEMENTS 5 (2010). 
100 450 U.S. 544 (1981)  
101 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262 (2001); see also AM. INDIAN L. DESKBOOK § 3:7. 
102 450 U.S. at 554 (“The mere fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the boundaries described in the treaty does not 
make the riverbed part of the conveyed land, especially when there is no express reference to the riverbed that might 
overcome the presumption against its conveyance.”). 
103 U.S. v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1989), quoting Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1258 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
104 Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1258 (discussing cases involving submerged lands around islands, tidelands). 
105 Treaty of Point Elliott, art. 2, Mar. 8, 1859. The Treaty also reserves additional lands for the purpose of establishing an 
agricultural and industrial school, and this grant specifically reserves “Tulalip Bay.” Id. at art. 3. 
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found this language sufficient even without an explicit reference to submerged lands.106 However, the 
Court found that the second and third prongs were not met because the Suquamish has not established 
dependence on the fishery resource for survival or an understanding of that reliance by the U.S. The 
Treaty secured to the Tribe “[t]he right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . 
in common with all citizens” of the state,107 and the court found that fishing in general was critical to 
survival. However, this survival depended not on the reservation-adjacent tidelands, but rather on 
fishery resources further afield.108 Thus, it failed to meet the requirement “that the disputed water 
resource [i.e., the submerged lands adjacent to the reservation] supply a significant portion of the tribe’s 
fishery needs.”109 It also held, given the guarantee of fishing rights in the Treaty, and in the absence of 
other evidence to the contrary, that the Government was unaware that inclusion of the tidelands was 
necessary to the Tribes.110 The result of this analysis was that the Suquamish claim to ownership of 
tidelands of the Port Madison reservation was denied. This holding does not bind the Tulalip Tribes not 
party to the litigation in U.S. v. Aam, but it suggests that the application of the 9th Circuit test to other 
tribal claims is likely to depend on factors beyond the treaty text, such as historical foodways or pre-
Treaty disputes over the use of particular tidelands. Absent a judicial determination, tribal ownership of 
submerged lands is uncertain, and blue carbon projects involving these lands may avoid challenges by 
including state land agencies in project transactions. 
5.1.2 Ambulatory Boundaries 
Property lines at the shoreline are “ambulatory”—they move over time.111 A variety of factors may 
affect the location of the mean high-water line, notably including erosion and sea level rise.112 Thus, 
changes to the landscape caused by coastal dynamics may result in a change in the ownership of a 
particular geographic location. In other words, an area that today is an upland marsh within a NWR unit 
may be submerged state property in 50 years. These changes may pose a risk for blue carbon project 
permanence and for ambiguous ownership of carbon rights.113 For example, coastal wetlands may 
migrate beyond defined project boundaries (and potentially property boundaries) or convert from 
upland to submerged lands, transferring ownership to the state. The managing agency may not be able 
to address changes in title unless the state is a partner in the offset project and enters into legally-
binding commitments to undertake needed management actions. These challenges may be less 
challenging for tribal lands where submerged areas are owned by the tribe—suggesting that, in these 
cases, projects on tribal lands may be more secure than those on federal lands. 
5.1.3 Competing Property Rights 
While many public lands are held by the government in fee simple, the government may own lesser 
rights in other lands. These lesser rights may take the form of limited property rights held by the 
government, such as easements, or encumbrances on public lands held by non-governmental entities, 
 
106 U.S. v. Aam, 887 F.2d at 195 (“the first Puyallup test should be understood to require only that the grant be capable of being 
interpreted to include the navigable waters within the reservation boundaries.”). 
107 Treaty of Point Elliott, art. 5, Mar. 8, 1859.  
108 U.S. v. Aam, 887 F.2d at 196-97. 
109 U.S. v. Aam, 887 F.2d at 196 (emphasis added). 
110 Id. at 197-98. 
111 See Alyson C. Flournoy, Beach Law Cleanup: How Sea-Level Rise has Eroded the Ambulatory Boundaries Legal Framework, 42 
VT. L. REV. 89 (2017). 
112 See AUDREY ELZERMAN, CONNECTICUT SEA GRANT, CENTER FOR LAND USE EDUCATION & RES., PROPERTY AND PERMITTING BOUNDARIES AT THE 
SHORELINE (2017) (discussing erosion, accretion, avulsion, and other factors affecting boundaries in changing environments 
under Connecticut law). 
113 Ambulatory boundaries may also result in challenges during the permitting process. These issues are beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 15 
such as mineral rights. The nature of government property rights and competing rights held by others 
may affect the ability of land management agencies to enter into blue carbon offset project agreements 
that meet carbon market requirements such as permanence and unambiguous ownership. 
In many coastal areas, non-governmental entities have acquired leaseholds or mineral rights over 
submerged lands, giving rise to complicated questions of access and ownership.114 In particular, “split 
estates” involving private ownership of mineral rights (including oil and gas rights) on public lands are 
common, including on two-thirds of National Park Service units and more than 100 NWRs.115 For 
example, legislation authorizing South Padre National Seashore explicitly allowed severance and 
exploitation of mineral rights.116 In most cases, owners have the right to exploit mineral rights under 
state law—even when those rights are located under public lands.117 However, land management 
agencies also have authority to manage extractive activities, particularly in National Parks and NWRs 
established for conservation purposes.118 While the use of these authorities may result in tension and 
litigation, restrictions on the timing and location of resource extraction in areas inside blue carbon offset 
project boundaries may be necessary to ensure that mineral rights owners do not undertake activities 
that would threaten the permanence of sequestration. Moreover, depending on the nature of the 
property rights held by non-governmental entities, project proponents may need to ensure that these 
entities cannot claim property rights to any carbon sequestered as part of the project.119 Without such 
protections, exclusion of tracts with severed mineral rights may be needed to avoid reversals due to 
incompatible activities. 
Property rights on tribal lands within reservations can be particularly complex. In general, Indian tribes 
are considered sovereign nations with plenary powers over tribal matters that are not subject to state 
law but are subject to federal government control.120 The federal government has used its power over 
time in ways that complicate tribal lands management. Under the Dawes Act of 1877, the federal 
government established a policy of subdividing tribal lands held in common into allotments held by the 
federal government on behalf of individual tribal members.121 Lands not allotted or leased by the 
government were sold to non-Indians as “surplus,” resulting in a patchwork of ownership within the 
boundaries of reservations. While Congress repealed the Dawes Act in 1934 with passage of the Indian 
 
114 See JIM WILKINS ET AL., LA. SEA GRANT COLLEGE PROGRAM, PRELIMINARY OPTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING RECREATIONAL SERVITUDES FOR AQUATIC 
ACCESS OVER PRIVATE WATER BOTTOMS 3-6 (2018) (discussing history and user conflicts related to submerged lands in coastal 
Louisiana). 
115 Andrew C. Mergen, Surface Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 431-32 
(1998); see also JAN G. LAITOS, ROCKY MTN. MINERAL LAW FOUND., LITERATURE REVIEW OF SEVERED MINERALS, SPLIT ESTATES, RIGHTS OF ACCESS, 
AND SURFACE USE IN MINERAL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS (2005).  
116 16 U.S.C. § 459d-3 (“[T]he Secretary shall permit a reservation by the grantor of all or any part of the oil and gas minerals in 
such land or waters and of other minerals therein which can be removed by similar means, with the right of occupation and use 
of so much of the surface of the land or waters as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining or 
removal of such from beneath the surface of these lands and waters.”). 
117 States have some regulatory authority over federal lands within their boundaries. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 
480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987). This authority may include resource extraction. Mergen, supra note 115, at 432-36 (discussing state 
law doctrines); James S. Burling, Local Control of Mining Activities on Federal Lands, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1986) (state law 
generally governs resource extraction on federal public lands). 
118 Mergen, supra note 115, at 449-57 (discussing NPS and FWS authority and cases). 
119 See Aaron M. Schutt, ANCSA Section 7(i): $40 Million Per Word and Counting, ALASKA L. REV. 229, 268-69 (2016) (assessing 
whether carbon credits are part of timber resource); but see Matthew J. Lepore & Derek L. Turner, Legislating Carbon 
Sequestration: Pore Space Ownership and Other Policy Considerations, 40 COLO. LAWYER 61 (Oct. 2011) (noting that owner of 
surface estate generally assumed to have right to pore space for carbon sequestration). 
120 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); AM. INDIAN L. DESKBOOK § 1:1 (explaining core tenets of American Indian law). 
121 See Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act, Native American Trusts, and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 
GONZ. L. REV. 609, 614-18 (2011) (discussing history, purpose, and effects of allotment policy). 
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Reorganization Act (IRA), some lands continue to be held as allotments or trust lands by the federal 
government, such that the tribes are not free to use them without federal government consent.122 The 
IRA provided for tribal self-government through constitutions, which could authorize tribal control over 
the disposition of tribal property.123 While not all tribes are covered by the IRA, many tribes, including 
the Tulalip Tribes, elected to be covered by the Act and are today governed under a tribal 
constitution.124 These constitutions provide for multiple types of land tenure, including allotments, 
assignments of tribal land for use by individual tribal members, and community lands—i.e., tribal lands 
not otherwise assigned.125 Community lands cannot be sold, but may be leased with the approval of the 
Secretary of Interior.126 Thus, blue carbon projects on tribal wetlands may involve complicated 
determinations of land ownership as well as a requirement to obtain federal approval for any lease of all 
or part of those lands (e.g., carbon rights, see section 5.2.3 below). 
Competing property rights to publicly-held coastal wetlands can raise hurdles related to permanence 
and ownership of carbon rights. The owner of property rights on public lands may have the right to 
perform activities on those lands inconsistent with sequestration. Alternatively, ownership of carbon 
rights produced on those lands may not be unambiguously held by either the land management agency 
or the owner of the mineral rights. Government authority over lands not held in fee simple therefore 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the government has the property 
rights needed to successfully carry out a blue carbon offset project and that the rights produced satisfy 
the requirements of carbon markets. 
5.2 Legal Authority for Agency Action 
In addition to property rights, land management agencies must have the statutory authority to carry out 
activities necessary for the completion of blue carbon projects on publicly-owned coastal wetlands. This 
section sets out key elements of the required legal authority, including (i) whether agencies are 
authorized to conduct the blue carbon project activities; (ii) whether they can accept donations; and (iii) 
whether they can transfer carbon rights away from public ownership. 
5.2.1 Authority for Restoration 
In most instances, statutes establish the standards and processes under which agencies are to manage 
public lands. Agencies cannot go beyond the authority provided by the legislature, but explicit 
authorization for them to conduct blue carbon projects is lacking. Agencies therefore must determine 
whether existing authority provides them with sufficient discretion to authorize blue carbon projects, or 
in the alternative whether more explicit authority is needed. 
5.2.1.1 Federal Lands 
In general, federal land management agencies have substantial discretion in managing lands under their 
control. They manage public lands, including wetlands, under “organic acts,” which provide general 
standards and authority, and site-specific legislation, which govern particular uses of individual land 
 
122 Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (prohibiting allotment after 1934). 
123 25 U.S.C. § 5123. 
124 AM. INDIAN L. DESKBOOK § 1:13; History, TULALIP TRIBES, https://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/WhoWeAre/History (last visited Oct. 
13, 2019). 
125 CONST. & BY-LAWS FOR THE TULALIP TRIBES art. VIII. 
126 Id. art. VIII, §§ 2-3. 
 17 
management units. Agency actions that are contrary to either type of statute are unlawful, but in most 
cases federal land management statutes are sufficiently broad to encompass blue carbon projects.127  
NPS has broad authority to engage in wetlands restoration under the Organic Act. The OA directs NPS to 
“conserve park resources while providing for their enjoyment, and ensure that all park resources are left 
‘unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.’”128 The OA does not define “unimpaired” or 
“conserve,” leaving NPS with “very broad management discretion under the statute.”129 Indeed, courts 
have generally upheld NPS management decisions despite changes in the agency’s interpretation of the 
meaning of its mandate over time.130 While not intended to support public recreation directly, activities 
intended to sequester carbon are likely to support both conservation and enjoyment of the parks, 
making them fully consistent with the OA. For example, the Verified Carbon Standard requires that 
wetlands projects restore degraded wetlands or conserve intact wetlands (consistent with conservation) 
and ensure continuous management over long time frames (consistent with the enjoyment of future 
generations).131 As a result, while the OA and NPS policies do not specifically address carbon offset 
generation on NPS-managed coastal wetlands, these activities do not appear to be foreclosed by the 
statute. 
Like NPS, FWS has authority to participate in carbon offset projects. The NWRSIA directs FWS to 
administer the NWR System “for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of 
the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of 
present and future generations of Americans.”132 Blue carbon offset projects are congruent with 
NWRSIA directives, such as habitat conservation, biological integrity, and water quality.133 Past 
afforestation offsets (see section 4.1) and incorporation of offsets in the 2010 FWS strategic plan on 
climate change134 also suggest that FWS has viewed carbon offsets as consistent with NWRSIA. However, 
carbon offset projects will likely require a location-specific determination of compatibility with Refuge 
purposes. The Service may permit any use of Refuge lands as long as “such uses are compatible with the 
major purposes for which such areas were established,”135 and FWS can make compatibility 
determinations through the required conservation plan for each NWR planning unit.136 Thus, the 
NWRSIA appears to offer ample authority for FWS to conduct blue carbon offset projects on NWR lands 
 
127 See, e.g., Pidot, supra note 87 (discussing BLM discretion in the absence of explicit authority). 
128 Eric Biber & Elisabeth Long Esposito, The National Park Service Organic Act and Climate Change, 56 NAT. RES. J. 193, 205 
(2016); see also 64 P.L. 235; 39 Stat. § 535; 64 Cong. Ch. 408 (Organic Act § 2) (“…promote and regulate the use of federal areas 
[by]…conserve[ing] … the natural and historic monuments… by such means that will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment 
of future generations.”). 
129 Biber & Esposito, supra note 128, at 229; see also id. at 204 (“the significant changes in the Park Service’s position over the 
years gives little basis to conclude that the Organic Act really does constrain management choices in a significant way.”).  
130 See Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir. 2000) (reviewing challenge to NPS determination 
involving change in agency interpretation of “impairment”); Biber & Esposito, supra note 128, at 221-22 (reporting on survey of 
cases). 
131 VERRA, supra note 49, at §§ A1.13 (“Eligible WRC activities are those that increase net GHG removals by restoring wetland 
ecosystems or that reduce GHG emissions by rewetting or avoiding the degradation of wetlands.”), 3.2.11 (“WRC projects shall 
demonstrate that the permanence of their soil carbon stock will be maintained. The maximum quantity of GHG emission 
reductions that may be claimed by the project is limited to the difference between project and baseline scenario after a 100-
year time frame.”).  
132 16 U.S.C. § 668dd.  
133 Id. § 668dd(a)(4). 
134 FWS, supra note 60, at 28. 
135 Id. § 668dd(d). 
136 Id. § 668dd(e). 
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provided that the Service has made an explicit compatibility determination supporting this use in 
individual NWR planning units.  
5.2.1.2 State Lands 
All state public land management statutes identified in this study were silent on the use of lands for 
production of carbon offsets. As a result, the legality of blue carbon projects will turn on whether blue 
carbon project activities are consistent with more general land management mandates. Like their 
federal counterparts, state land management agencies have broad authority to manage lands under 
their jurisdiction for the benefit of the public, such that blue carbon projects will likely be viable under 
state public lands management requirements.  
While state public lands agencies generally have broad authority, applicable laws do limit the uses of 
specific types of state lands. Some lands are managed under a permissive multiple-use paradigm; for 
example, Florida’s “sovereignty lands” are to be managed to produce proceeds for the state, unless 
leased to a state agency for a more specific use.137 Other lands must be managed for a specific primary 
purpose or set of purposes. For example, MassWildlife must administer wildlife sanctuaries “for the 
purpose of improving the feeding and nesting environment of birds or mammals.”138 Such conditions are 
particularly likely on state parks and other conservation lands, where blue carbon projects are likely to 
be consistent with management purposes because they are designed to provide a range of ecosystem 
benefits in addition to offsets for sale on carbon markets. However, some state lands may not be fully 
consistent with blue carbon projects if dedicated to uses other than conservation. For example, Florida 
allows lands to be designated for a single use “to the exclusion of all other purposes” that are not 
compatible with the primary purpose of the lands.139 Blue carbon projects may not be compatible with 
some single-use management purposes, such as “production of food and livestock,” and in such cases 
would require a change in management regime for a project to succeed.140 Projects thus may be 
problematic on a few specific tracts, but they will likely be compatible with management frameworks 
covering most coastal wetlands. 
As blue carbon projects are consistent with state lands management mandates, questions of authority 
for these projects are likely to devolve to permitting agencies that may need to approve specific 
components of blue carbon projects. In particular, projects in coastal wetlands are likely to require 
permits from wetlands regulators if they involve dredge or fill or structures in any tidal wetland. For 
example, Massachusetts law requires proponents to obtain a permit from the relevant municipal 
Conservation Commission before beginning any project covered by the Wetlands Act.141 Other, state-
specific permitting regimes may also apply, such as Louisiana’s requirement for a Coastal Use Permit 
from LDNR prior to activities that will directly or significantly affect coastal waters.142 The specific 
permits required, and the terms and conditions that may be applied, are highly project-specific and 
differ by jurisdiction. 
While every state has its own permitting regimes and practices, none of these regimes appears to 
explicitly address permitting of wetland restoration projects financed through blue carbon offsets. As for 
 
137 FLA. STAT. § 253.03 (“It is the intent of the Legislature that the board of trustees continue to receive proceeds from the sale or 
disposition of the products of lands and the sale of lands of which the use and possession are not subsequently transferred by 
appropriate lease or similar instrument from the board of trustees to the proper using agency.”). 
138 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 8. 
139 FLA. STAT. § 253.034. 
140 Id. 
141 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 40. 
142 LA. STAT. §§ 49:214.30, 214.23 (defining “use”). 
 19 
general management of state lands, permitting of coastal wetland restoration projects therefore will 
depend on the application of generally-applicable permitting requirements that are more commonly 
used for activities such as piers and coastal protection structures. Nonetheless, as noted in section 1, 
this study assumes that blue carbon projects will qualify for permitting because they improve and 
restore degraded wetlands and thus are consistent with the goals of permitting programs. For example, 
LDNR cannot issue a Coastal Use Permit for an activity unless it is “consistent with the agency’s coastal 
master plan for integrated coastal protection.”143 The master plan, in turn, must adopt an integrated 
approach to coastal management that “The legislature has directed that plan be intended to “conserve, 
restore, create, and enhance wetlands and barrier shorelines or reefs in coastal Louisiana” in tandem 
with encouraging use of coastal resources.144 Coastal wetland restoration projects that require a Coastal 
Use Permit will be able to demonstrate consistency with this goal, and thus with the plan, if they are 
appropriately sited and designed. Similarly, most projects will be able to demonstrate compatibility with 
permitting requirements under other permitting programs in other states. 
Finally, the public trust doctrine presents additional limitations on state management of submerged 
lands that may be independent of statutory law and do not apply to federal or tribal land management. 
The public trust doctrine applies in every state and requires that all state-owned submerged lands be 
held in trust for public use.145 As a result, states must manage submerged lands, including coastal 
wetlands, for the benefit of their citizens and cannot violate their citizens’ rights to use those lands for 
protected activities.146 The boundaries of the areas subject to the public trust and the protected 
activities differ by state.147 In most states, the boundary between private ownership and public trust 
lands is mean high water, but some states have established different standards. Boundaries of public 
trust waters do not necessarily track property boundaries—to the contrary, states including 
Massachusetts and Louisiana “extend public trust rights to the high-water mark even though they 
recognize upland private ownership down to the low-water mark.”148 Similarly, private entities may own 
submerged lands due to pre-statehood grants, as noted above for Spanish grants in Florida. Protected 
uses generally include at least fishing, commerce, and navigation, but some states have expanded 
protections to cover other uses, which in Florida, Louisiana, and Massachusetts all include vague, but 
expansive protection of indeterminate uses.149 States implement their public trust responsibilities 
through a variety of permitting standards—in Florida, for example, the legislature has determined that 
water bottoms must be “managed for the maintenance of essentially natural conditions.”150 Similarly, 
Washington enacted the Shoreline Management Act to protect and manage its public trust areas.151 
Thus, state public trust obligations may be integrated with permitting requirements, but careful review 
of applicable trust boundaries and protected uses may avoid hurdles arising from state public trust 
obligations. 
 
143 Id. § 49:214.30. 
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149 Id. at 18. 
150 Id. (“All submerged lands shall be considered single-use lands and shall be managed primarily for the maintenance of 
essentially natural conditions, the propagation of fish and wildlife, and public recreation”). 
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While the public trust doctrine imposes limits on the management of submerged lands, it does not 
appear to unduly hinder blue carbon-financed restoration projects on coastal wetlands. These projects 
do not generally involve alienation of trust lands, but rather at most transfer of a leasehold covering 
carbon rights, as discussed in section 5.2.3. Moreover, wetland restoration projects are unlikely to 
undermine public trust uses, as they enhance the value of fisheries resources and may also be 
compatible with additional uses, such as recreation. However, projects that require exclusion of the 
public from areas of the project site subject to the public trust may be incompatible with state trust 
obligations and may violate state land management and/or permitting law. Thus, accommodation of 
public trust uses in project design may be beneficial to ensure that projects satisfy both state trust 
obligations and carbon market requirements. 
5.2.1.3 Tribal Lands 
Tribal land management standards may be set out in tribal codes, constitutions, or treaties, but such 
authority does not appear mandatory. For example, while the Natural Resources Department manages 
wetlands on the Tulalip reservation in practice, its authority appears to devolve from the Tribes’ Board 
of Directors, which has land management authority under the tribal constitution.152 Without codes 
delineating specific principles for land management, the authority of the Department is uncertain. 
Nonetheless, wetland restoration projects appear to be consistent with the limited existing law 
governing management of tribal lands. The constitution states that “[c]ommunity land which is not 
assigned, including community timber reserves, shall be managed by the board of directors for the 
benefit of the members of the entire community.”153 Wetlands account for a substantial proportion of 
community land—according to the Natural Resources Department, wetlands account for 20% of the 
Tulalip Reservation, and 23% of all Tribal Trust land is wetland.154 The Tribes value the community 
benefits provided by these wetlands, noting that they “enhance human quality of life by controlling 
flooding, filtering surface water runoff, recharging groundwater supplies, and providing fascinating 
habitat for education and recreation.”155 While the Tribal Code does not explicitly set out how 
unassigned wetlands are to be governed, these varied purposes suggest that wetlands restoration is 
consistent with the requirement to manage lands for the benefit of the entire community, and the tribal 
Board of Directors, through the Natural Resources Department, likely has the authority to undertake 
blue carbon offset projects.  
5.2.2 Authority to Accept Donations of Money and Land 
Blue carbon offset projects require land managers to partner with non-governmental entities. The 
transactional relationships among project partners include donations by non-governmental entities to 
land management agencies as well as various forms of contractual transactions among private and 
governmental project partners. This section considers whether land management agencies are 
authorized to acquire or accept donations of money and land from private entities. Blue carbon offset 
projects structured as donations of land are likely to occur on “acquired lands,” while donations of 
money for maintenance of specific tracts may be used on acquired or existing public lands. The 
afforestation projects reviewed in section 4.1 provide useful examples of these structures. In these 
projects, private entities donated lands to FWS, while withholding carbon rights, and also donated 
funding to allow FWS to maintain the lands to ensure sequestration for the duration of the offset period. 
In these and similar projects, the transfer of the land and maintenance funds are effectively a donation, 
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even if the government may commit to maintaining the lands in particular ways as a condition of the 
gift.   
Most land management agencies have relevant authority allowing them to acquire lands and accept 
donations. However, the extent and conditions on acquisitions and gifts may differ by agency. Key 
questions related to agency authority to accept donations include: 
• Can the agency accept donated money and land? 
• Can donations be conditioned, such as by dedication to particular agency activities or sites? 
• Is a quasi-governmental foundation available to accept donations?  
In some instances, statutes constrain how agencies may accept donations and the activities for which 
they can use the donations, while in others, legislatures may provide multiple options for transfer of 
assets, such as a quasi-governmental foundation allowing obligation of funds. Blue carbon project 
partners can benefit from consideration of whether and how assets can be transferred during the 
project design stage to ensure that transactions adhere to any applicable legal conditions. 
5.2.2.1 Federal Donations 
NPS has broad authority to accept donations in multiple formats, allowing flexibility in the design of blue 
carbon offset projects. The Organic Act authorizes NPS to accept money “donated for the purposes of 
the System” and to accept donated land within existing park system boundaries (e.g., inholdings, 
severed estates).156 In addition, the Act specifically authorizes NPS to “acquire by donation, purchase 
with donated funds, transfer from any other Federal agency, or exchange, land, water, or interests in 
land or water adjacent to the System unit.”157 The Act also establishes the National Park Foundation, 
which may accept any “gift, devise, or bequest,” including interests in real property and gifts restricted 
to particular uses, so long as these donations do not “entail[] any expenditure other than from the 
resources of the Foundation.”158 The Foundation has broad latitude in the use of these funds,159 which 
would likely allow contributions specifically for use to support restoration and maintenance of specific 
project areas. Thus, NPS has the ability to accept a variety of donations itself and through a not-for-
profit foundation that can enable provision of funding for long-term maintenance of specific areas, 
among other purposes. 
FWS has more limited discretion to accept donations. The NWRSIA explicitly authorizes FWS to “[a]ccept 
donations of funds and to use such funds to acquire or manage lands.”160 Thus, FWS can accept funding 
for land acquisition or management, but it appears to lack explicit authority to accept land without 
compensating the landowner. If so, this limitation could require that projects involving blue carbon 
offsets on newly-acquired lands be structured around donations of funding that are subsequently used 
to acquire the project site rather than through direct donation of lands by non-governmental entities. 
However, precedent projects, such as the Tensas River NWR project discussed in section 4.1, did involve 
the direct donation of lands by non-federal entities. As a result, FWS does appear to have authority to 
accept land donations in practice. A second difference lies in the absence of a foundation or ability to 
direct donations to particular FWS activities or sites. Thus, while NWRSIA provides ample authority for 
 
156 54 U.S.C. § 101101. 
157 Id. § 100506(c)(1)(B). 
158 Id. § 101113. 
159 Id. § 101114. 
160 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(b)(2). The Service can also acquire lands by exchange. Id. § 668dd(b)(3). 
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FWS to accept resources needed to accomplish blue carbon offset projects, it lacks specific powers that 
may be useful in some project scenarios. 
5.2.2.2 State Donations 
State agencies are generally authorized to accept donations of money and land. For example, Louisiana 
law allows OSP to accept and land, money, or other property “to be expended or used for establishing, 
developing, improving, or maintaining any office of state parks holding.”161 It can also acquire, by lease 
or otherwise, land (including water bottoms) for OSP holdings from the federal government or other 
entities.162  
Some but not all states have explicitly authorized dedication of donations for particular uses or sites. 
While the Louisiana OSP lacks explicit authority for such dedications, the commissioner of the 
Massachusetts DEM can receive “bequests, restitutions or gifts to be used for the purpose of advancing 
the recreational and conservation interests of the commonwealth.”163 Such donations must be managed 
according to their terms, allowing them to be dedicated to particular sites and uses.164 Such restrictions 
on terms may be important to ensure that donations remain associated with a blue carbon offset 
project tract rather than used for more general agency land management activities. 
Some states also have established trusts or foundations that allow donations to be segregated from 
agency budgets, which may offer benefits for particular projects. For example, the Massachusetts DEM 
commissioner may also accept “gifts of land outside the urban park district to be held and managed for 
recreational and conservation purposes,” which are known as the Conservation Trust.165 Where 
available, such trusts may have benefits and drawbacks for project partners (e.g., tax consequences, 
segregation of funds from agency budgets, limited authority to bind agency). While consideration of 
these benefits and drawbacks is beyond the scope of this study, availability of quasi-governmental land-
management entities may be useful in the context of some projects. 
Some states require that gifts be restricted to particular uses. For example, MassWildlife may accept 
donations of land or personal property with approval by the governor only for the purpose of “aiding in 
the propagation and protection of any useful fish, birds or mammals.”166 Thus, MassWildlife would not 
be authorized to accept donations as part of blue carbon projects unless they benefit fish and wildlife. 
Wetland restoration projects financed with blue carbon offsets are likely to satisfy such requirements 
because they provide ecosystem services along with carbon sequestration. However, these restrictions 
could affect project design or require project proponents to document and ensure that benefits to fish 
and wildlife will result from project expenditures. Design of blue carbon offset projects in light of 
mandatory conditions on donations may ensure that eventual projects are consistent with agency 
mandates. 
5.2.2.3 Tribal Donations 
The Tulalip Tribes has broad authority to accept donations itself and through a dedicated fund. Under 
the Tribal Code, the Tulalip Tribes may accept nonprofit monetary and land donations for any lawful 
charitable or public purpose.167 Under this authority, the tribes’ Board of Directors could itself accept 
 
161 LA. STAT. 56:1687. 
162 Id. 
163 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 132A, § 1. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 7. 
167 TULALIP TRIBAL CODES § 15.10.020. 
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monetary or labor donations in support of a blue carbon offset project. Alternatively, the Tulalip Tribes 
may establish a fund for the purpose of accepting and distributing gifts of monies or property for the 
public benefit of the Tribe.168 Such a fund would act as a nonprofit organization that would lawfully 
“receive gifts and funds and distribute monetary funds or property donated by individuals or 
corporations for any lawful charitable or public purpose or purposes.”169 Thus, third parties seeking to 
conduct blue carbon projects in partnership with the Tribes have multiple options for structuring 
agreements for transfer of required funding for specific uses. 
Acceptance of land donations to the Tribes as part of a blue carbon offset project may require additional 
approvals. While the Tribal Code allows acceptance of donated land, consent from the Secretary of the 
Interior may be required under the Tribes’ constitution. Specifically, the tribal constitution provides that 
consent is required for the use of tribal funds “to acquire land” and that acquired lands must be within 
or adjacent to reservation boundaries.170 As even acceptance of donated lands may require expenditure 
of tribal funds (e.g., for surveys, title search, and other assessments), consent from the Secretary may be 
required for projects involving donated land to proceed. Thus, blue carbon-financed wetland restoration 
projects may be authorized on lands to be subsequently transferred to the Tribes, such as allotment 
lands within a reservation, but federal involvement in these projects may be needed. 
5.2.3 Authority to Transfer Carbon Rights  
Blue carbon offset projects on public lands generally require a non-governmental entity to obtain the 
unambiguous right to claim carbon offsets from the project area. If the project partner does not 
unambiguously own the carbon rights, the resulting offsets may not qualify for listing on carbon 
markets.171 As the carbon rights are previously held by the landowner (i.e., a government agency), it is 
necessary for the landowner to agree to relinquish its right to claim carbon offsets through transfer of 
property rights or some other means. Some land management agencies are authorized to transfer 
property rights, while others lack such authorization or must comply with limits on such transfers, such 
as limits on the length of obligations on government lands. Carbon offset projects must fit within these 
statutory limitations as well as those established in voluntary carbon market standards. This section 
addresses agency authorization to transfer carbon rights from coastal wetlands and potential avenues, 
other than transfers of property rights, whereby agencies may relinquish their rights to claim offsets 
generated on their coastal wetlands. 
Carbon rights are an interest in property with monetary value. Agencies have limited authority to 
transfer public property rights from public lands, as such transfers may threaten the purposes for which 
these lands were set aside. However, examples of authorized transactions involving interests in land 
abound; for example, land managers commonly “sell[] timber, allow[] mineral extraction in exchange for 
royalty payments, and [accept] lease payments by concessionaires that provide services on federal 
lands.”172 In order to carry out these transactions, land management agencies must have statutory 
authorization.  
Agencies authority to transfer property rights to public lands ranges from very limited to almost 
unbounded, but none explicitly cover the transfer of carbon rights. Relevant authorities may be as broad 
as a general directive to sell any unprotected public land (or interests in land, such as mineral rights) or 
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as narrow as authority to sell rights for specific products of the land (e.g., timber rights for areas 
affected by invasive pests and diseases). In no case, however, do current statutes explicitly authorize (or 
prohibit) the sale of carbon rights. Where statutes are silent, blue carbon transactions involving rights 
transfers can only proceed if existing general authority is sufficiently broad to authorize the transaction. 
Such authority is far more likely to exist in the context of “multiple-use” agencies with broad mandates 
for exploitative use of public lands than in agencies directed to conserve land for public enjoyment and 
use. 
NPS does not appear to be authorized to convey carbon rights from its lands except in very limited 
circumstances. The OA provides limited statutory authority to enter into specific types of contracts 
related to property, such as for visitor services and timber cutting (where affected by pests and 
diseases),173 but it does not provide general authority for lease or sale of property interests in NPS lands. 
The one potentially-relevant exception allows sale or lease of lands under NPS jurisdiction that are not 
located in national parks or national monuments of scientific significance.174 NPS regulations further 
limit the lands to which this exception applies, requiring that it be designated as a Special Use Zone and 
have a completed resource survey prior to leasing.175 Leases on these lands must be for a fair market 
value and include “such terms and conditions as will ensure the use of the property in a manner that is . 
. . consistent with the purpose for which the System unit or related area was authorized by Congress.”176 
Proceeds under this section must be deposited in the Land and Water Conservation Fund and may not 
be available for use in maintaining specific project sites.177 Under this authority, it is unlikely that NPS 
will be authorized to transfer property rights to carbon on most of its coastal wetlands. 
FWS also lacks authority to transfer property interests. The NWRSIA authorizes commercial activities in 
the NWR system, consistent with refuge purposes, but this authority is related to public 
accommodations rather than environmental services.178 As a result, FWS appears unable to legally 
transfer property rights from NWR units, including blue carbon offsets, even if those transfers enable 
activities, like coastal wetlands restoration, that enhance the conservation purposes for which the 
refuges were set aside. 
Even were NPS or FWS authorized to transfer carbon rights on their lands, additional limitations would 
apply to the duration and form of those transfers. For example, the federal Antideficiency Act prohibits 
government obligation of funds that have not been appropriated by Congress.179 This limitation would 
prohibit an agency from committing to fund a project, in whole or part, beyond the date of its current 
appropriations. Later direct government funding, if needed, would be contingent on continued 
appropriations, presenting a permanence issue for projects reliant on partial federal funding. Similarly, 
federal contracting limitations would likely prohibit agencies from accepting responsibility for funding 
and committing to conduct long-term stewardship necessary to maintain additionality. Another project 
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partner, such as the non-public entity receiving the carbon rights, would likely be called upon to provide 
the financial assurance necessary to fund long-term stewardship.180 
Agency-specific statutes and regulations may also limit the structure and provisions of carbon transfers. 
For example, the OA prohibits NPS from entering into any lease or privilege of a “natural curiosity, 
wonder, or object of interest” that would “interfere with free access by the public to any System 
unit.”181 NPS regulations also include restrictions on the length of certain lease transactions, where 
authorized, such as a maximum length of 60 years on the lease of historic properties.182 While the latter 
two examples may not apply to specific blue carbon project sites, they are examples of potential 
restrictions on the rights that agencies may legally convey and the length of obligations they may enter 
into. These restrictions may present challenges for compliance with voluntary carbon market standards. 
Some state land management agencies have substantially broader authority to transfer property rights 
than NPS or FWS. For example, Florida law indicates that the Board of Trustees of the Internal 
Improvement Trust Fund is to “continue to receive proceeds from the sale or disposition of the products 
of lands and the sale of lands.”183 Similarly, any Louisiana land-management entity, including but not 
limited to OSL, can lease state lands under their jurisdiction “for trapping, grazing, hunting, agricultural, 
and any other legitimate purposes” other than mineral development.184 This applies to conservation 
lands managed by OSP, which can be sold, leased, or subleased “when [the agency] believes it 
advantageous to the state to do so.”185 These broad authorities for transfer of title and leases to lands 
are likely broad enough to encompass the sale or lease of lesser property rights, including carbon rights 
to upland areas of coastal wetlands. 
Some state agencies may have less ability to transfer property rights in general or on land units set aside 
for conservation. For example, Washington statutes provide for sale and lease of (among other things) 
land,186 property rights to land (e.g., mineral rights),187 and the sale of “valuable materials” from aquatic 
lands.188 However, disposition of state lands designated as natural area preserves is tightly restricted: 
such lands “shall be held in trust and shall not be alienated except to another public use upon a finding 
by the department of natural resources of imperative and unavoidable public necessity.”189 These 
restrictions are consistent with other restrictions on the transfer of lands set aside for conservation use. 
As a result, transfer of carbon rights on conservation lands is likely to be more legally constrained than 
on other types of state lands.  
States may have more limited power to sell carbon rights on submerged lands than on uplands due to 
public trust limitations (see section 5.2.1.2). In some states, alienation of submerged lands is allowed, 
provided that sales are subject to continuing public trust limitations. Thus, the Washington Supreme 
Court recently explained: 
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[T]he State owns [tidelands and shorelands] in two distinct capacities. First, as title 
owner, “the [S]tate holds full proprietary rights in tidelands and shorelands and has fee 
simple title to such lands” so that it “may convey title to [those lands] in any manner 
and for any purpose not forbidden by the state or federal constitutions and its grantees 
take title as absolutely as if the transaction were between private individuals.” . . . . 
Second, because such land is also held by the State in trust and for the benefit of the 
people, any right conveyed generally remains subservient to the public right to use 
water in place for navigation[.]”190 
Thus, Washington law allows the sale of property rights up to and including full title to submerged lands, 
and sale of carbon rights is likely lawful. In other states, like Louisiana, such sales are far more restricted. 
While Louisiana law authorizes sale of uplands, it prohibits alienation of state water bottoms except 
under particular conditions, primarily related to reclamation of lands, including mineral rights, lost due 
to erosion, subsidence, compaction, or sea level rise.191 The Florida constitution also limits sales of 
submerged lands to a narrow set of situations.192 While sales of submerged lands can be highly 
restricted, transactions involving less permanent control or occupation of submerged lands are generally 
allowed for activities that do not undermine trust uses. As a result, transfer of carbon rights from 
submerged lands in some states may require the use of a lease, permit, or license rather than a transfer 
of title.  
Finally, transfer of carbon rights from tribal lands is likely to follow similar patterns as federal and state 
lands, with authority to alienate or otherwise transfer rights governed by the applicable treaty, tribal 
constitution, and tribal codes. Tribal transfers are unique, however, in that federal approval is likely to 
be required for transfer of tribal property. For example, the Tulalip Constitution authorizes the Board of 
Directors to “approve or veto any sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in 
lands, or other tribal assets.”193 The Tribal Code additionally authorizes the Tribes to “lease any and all 
tribal lands on the Tulalip Reservation, whether in trust, restricted, or fee status,” for a variety of public 
and private uses and for up to 70 years (with options to renew).194 However, both the tribal constitution 
and codes require approval by the Secretary of Interior for any sale or lease of tribal lands, including any 
lease for exploitation of “any natural resource.”195 Wetlands are likely considered a natural resource 
subject to this requirement.196 In sum, the Tribes appear authorized to sell carbon rights derived from 
community lands only with federal approval and only for a period of up to 70 years. These limitations 
may increase the costs of carbon offset transactions on the reservation and pose challenges for 
demonstrating the permanence of blue carbon offsets, which require commitments beyond a 70-year 
timeframe.  
The foregoing analysis suggests a range of authorities for transfer of property rights from public coastal 
wetlands. In instances where wetlands are included in public land units reserved for conservation 
purposes, land managers have limited authority to transfer property rights for commercial purposes, 
even where the commercial activity enhances conservation. Leasing activity on public lands managed by 
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other federal agencies or by states or tribes may be authorized, but even in these cases, limitations on 
lease terms or required conditions may prove challenging for offset projects requiring legal certainty 
over terms as long as 100 years.  
Where agencies are unable or unwilling to transfer property rights to carbon, a different mechanism for 
transferring rights may be required for a blue carbon project to succeed. In some contexts where leases 
of public lands are not authorized, such as fisheries and aquaculture, agencies propose another type of 
relationship (e.g., license, permit, contract, or cooperative agreement) that does not transfer a property 
right.197 Public land management agencies generally have the power to enter into contractual and 
cooperative relationships for activities that are consistent with their land management mandates. For 
example, the Louisiana OSP can, “for a public purpose, engage in cooperative endeavors” with other 
agencies and non-governmental entities.198 The agreements establishing these cooperative endeavors, 
such as the MOAs used by FWS in its afforestation projects, may not transfer property rights and 
therefore may avoid concerns about disposition of public lands. However, they may be problematic 
from a carbon market perspective if they do not transfer unambiguous carbon rights for the full duration 
of the offset period – or such shorter time or subject to protections such as renewal rights as may be 
required by carbon markets at the outset of the project period.199 Project partners and carbon market 
standards may differ on the legal certainty that is needed to effectively and unambiguously transfer of 
these carbon rights. As a result, careful consideration of carbon market standards is needed where 
carbon rights are transferred in a form that is not a sale or long-term lease. 
Creative transaction structures may be needed to transfer carbon rights effectively without violating 
agency limits on whether and how property rights to public lands can be alienated. These transaction 
structures could entail long-term contracts, cooperative agreements, or MOAs that do not transfer 
property rights to non-governmental entities but which may satisfy carbon market standards. They may 
also entail transfers that do not qualify as property rights, such as a privilege to claim offsets that remain 
owned by the agency. Site-specific additional research may be needed to evaluate the legality of such 
creative approaches on particular blue carbon offset project sites. 
6 Guidance for Land Managers 
This study has identified a variety of potential legal hurdles to successful implementation of blue carbon-
financed restoration projects on publicly-owned coastal wetlands. This section assists project 
proponents in implementing the information provided. Specifically, it identifies guidance in four areas 
that may assist project managers in identifying and avoiding or overcoming legal hurdles to project 
deployment. Development of blue carbon offset projects is inherently site-specific, occurring in the 
context of a particular ecosystem, array of cultural uses, project partners, and suite of laws and 
regulations. As the relevant legal standards and authority will differ substantially from place to place, 
this study cannot provide guidance on the legal challenges associated with any specific blue carbon 
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offset project. Instead, the following guidance is intended to provide generalized considerations to assist 
project proponents in navigating the most substantial legal challenges that were identified in this study.  
6.1 Identify All Owners of the Project Site Throughout the Offset Project Period Required for 
Permanence 
Sea level rise and coastal erosion are likely to substantially change the geographic location of the 
property boundary between submerged lands and uplands as well as the location of coastal wetlands in 
upland areas. Blue carbon offset project sites are likely to need to migrate with coastal dynamics in 
order to ensure continuing sequestration benefits and avoid permanence problems, and projects that 
do not account for geographic change are at risk of violating unambiguous ownership requirements of 
voluntary carbon markets. To avoid these problems in the future, project proponents may use coastal 
change models to identify reasonable expectations for migration of the coastline and the relevant 
coastal wetland area throughout the offset project period. The expected future locations of the coast 
and wetlands can be used to identify any relevant property owners of the project site, including upland 
owners of areas where marshes may migrate and submerged lands owners who may take title to the 
current project site. Project proponents will also benefit by identifying any severed estates or competing 
property rights to the project site that could require the public landowner to accommodate 
development inconsistent with the offset project. Each of these property owners may need to waive 
their rights, including potential future offset claims, through an easement or other mechanism that 
survives transfers of property ownership in order for the unambiguous ownership and permanence 
expectations to be met. 
6.2 Determine Whether and How Public Agencies Can Transfer Carbon Rights to the Project 
Site 
The ability of public agencies to transfer carbon rights to a private owner is likely to be among the most 
substantial challenges to blue carbon project success. Land managers working to develop blue carbon 
offset projects thus must determine whether the relevant public agencies are authorized to alienate 
carbon rights as a property rights transaction (such as a leasehold). For agencies without explicit 
authority to transfer property rights, project proponents will require alternative mechanisms, such as 
non-binding MOAs or use of newly-acquired lands (rather than existing public lands), to ensure that the 
public offset investor has adequate ownership interest in the carbon rights to meet the requirements of 
the voluntary carbon market. For example, past FWS projects have primarily occurred on private lands 
subsequently added to the NWR system—reserving the carbon rights on those lands to the offset 
owner. Similar attention to siting and transaction structure may be able to overcome legal hurdles in 
other contexts by locating projects on inholdings or conservation lands or by using non-governmental 
foundations as part of project transactions to obligate maintenance funds for site-specific uses. 
As failure to reach agreement on the acceptable form of carbon rights transfers could effectively halt an 
offset project, determination of the structure of these transactions is an important early consideration 
for project proponents. These consultations may need to include not only the agency, investor, and 
conservation provider partners, but also carbon market representatives, to ensure that rights 
transactions satisfy market standards. Successful delineation of the structure of carbon rights transfers 
will be likely to drive project design and will thus provide important guiderails for the technical and site-
specific planned actions.  
6.3 Address Time Limits on Public Lands Transactions 
Blue carbon offset projects may require maintenance of sequestration for up to 100 years. This long 
time period is a challenge for public agencies due to limitations on the term of required leaseholds or 
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other legal agreements needed to transfer carbon rights for the entirety of the project period. Where 
limitations on transaction length are shorter than the period required for permanence, project 
proponents may need to determine whether alternative legal arrangements satisfy carbon markets. For 
example, shorter-term carbon rights transactions with a limited right of renewal may satisfy both carbon 
market standards and public land agency mandates. Alternatively, as for authority for transfers of 
carbon rights, transactions that do not require a leasehold or other property transaction may be 
required to satisfy agency mandates; in such cases, project proponents may need to obtain assurance 
from the relevant carbon market that the proposed structure is acceptable. 
6.4 Review Site-Specific Legal Framework 
While not covered in detail in this report, individual land management units, such as National Parks, may 
be subject to site-specific legislation. This legislation (and associated regulations) may alter factors such 
as what the activities allowed on individual public land units and how the relevant agency is required to 
manage the site. In addition, projects on specific sites are subject to additional requirements of federal, 
state, and/or tribal law that may not be covered in this report. Consideration of these site-specific 
requirements is necessary for successful implementation of projects on sites subject to these 
individualized management requirements.  
